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This project focused on the intention and consequence 
aspects of moral judgment decision making. The rationale 
for this study was based in Piaget's (1932/1965) theory of 
moral judgment and Kohlberg's (1969) stage theory of moral 
development. 
The purpose of this study was to reexamine Piaget's 
conception of the role of intention and consequence as basis 
for moral judgments and assess the implication of this study 
for Kohlberg's concept of homogeneity of moral reasoning 
stages. Specifically, the present study examined the effects 
of manipulating severity of consequences in moral dilemmas. 
This thesis deviates from the format called for in the 
Thesis Writing Manual (1982). The body of this thesis consists 
of a manuscript prepared for submission to a technical journal 
under the guidelines of the Publication Manual of the American 
Psychological Association (1983). Materials which are usually 
presented in the body of the thesis are presented in appendixes. 
The appendixes contain a review of the literature and 
supplemental materials, raw data, and statistical analyses. 
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~Abstract 
This study investigated the effects of severity of 
consequence in moral dilemmas on the moral judgments of 
61 adults. All subjects received a common baseline story 
and one of two versions of four remaining stories. The 
stories differed in terms of intent and consequence. The 
story with the most positive intention and the most severe 
consequences produced the clearest evidence of consequence 
influenced judgments. The actor iri this story was judged 
to be less intelligent and more careless (E<.Ol) when the 
outcome was more severe. This suggests that adults may 
respond on the basis of consequence just as children do. 
These findings raise questions concerning Kohlberg's 
conception of homogeneity of moral reasoning stages and are 




Intention and Consequence Reconsidered 
Piaget (1932/1965) proposed a theory of moral judgment 
based on cognitive development and social experience, 
consisting of two stages of development. According to Piaget, 
the young child makes moral judgments based on consequence 
with a transition to intention-based judgments occurring 
about seven years of age. 
Kohlberg's (1969) theory, like Piaget's, emphasizes 
cognitive structures as underlying and organizing moral 
reasoning. Kohlberg's (1969) system consists of six stages 
of development. These six stages or organized systems of 
thought form an invariant sequence with movement always 
forward, never bac~Mard, and upward to the next stage. 
Stages are never skipped and moral judgments are consistent 
within stages. 
Challenges to Kohlberg's (1969) assumptions that each 
stage of moral reasoning is homogeneous have been made by 
research studies (O'Malley, 1986; Walster; 1966) that have 
shown subjects can change the level of moral reasoning 
depending on the environmental circumstances, at times making 
moral judgments at one stage and at other times a different 
stage. Similar challenges to Piaget's (1932/1965) theory 
exist. For example, several researchers have shown that young 
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children who might be expected to make judgments on the 
basis of consequence, can under certain circumstances make 
them on the basis of intention (Berg-Cross, 1975; Moran & 
McCullers, 1984). Further, it has been demonstrated (Moran 
& O'Brien, 1983a; Moran & O'Brien, 1983b; Shultz, Wright, & 
Schleifer, 1986) that the young child is capable of using 
the actor's intent as the basis of forming moral judgments 
across a wide range of contexts. 
Moran and McCullers (1984) read stories to children 
aged 4, 7, and 11 years, and to college freshmen to investigate 
the effects of recency and specific story content on moral 
reasoning. Their findings indicated that the child was able 
to use intent information, and thus made more negative 
judgments, only when the content involved injury to a person. 
Elkind and Dabek (1977) suggested that young children 
judge personal injury as more serious than property damage, 
and thus make selective judgments on the basis of story content. 
They found that kindergarten, second-, and fourth-grade children 
judged personal injury as more culpable than property damage 
when intentionality was held constant. Thus, personal injury 
appears to elicit harsher moral judgments than other negative 
outcomes, regardless of intent. 
In another study, Suls, Gutkin, and Kalle (1979) 
investigated roles of damage, intention and social consequence 
in moral judgments of children at all age levels from 
kindergarten through fifth grade. Both intention cues and 
social consequence cues increased in importance with age, 
and parental reaction rather than peer reaction cues had 
more of an impact on children's judgments. 
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Elkind (1981) suggested that, when dealing with children, 
adults may judge actions on a quantitative ("consequence") 
basis rather than upon intention, giving more severe 
punishment for larger amounts of damage. As a result children 
may learn the importance of consequences by observing reactions 
to behavior. 
Walster (1966) manipulated severity of consequences 
in accidents and found that adult subjects were harsher in 
their moral judgments when consequences were more severe. 
Thus it appears that adults, like children, do at times 
make judgments on the basis of consequence. 
The purpose of this study was to reexamine Piaget's 
conception of the role of intention and consequence as basis 
for moral judgments and assess the implication of this study 
for Kohlberg's concept of homogeneity of moral reasoning 
stages. It was hypothesized that adults will at times make 
moral judgments based on the outcome of a situation, rather 
than the actor's intent, just as children do. Specifically, 
it was expected that actors in stories with more severe 
outcomes would be evaluated more harshly. The present study 
examined the effects of manipulating severity of consequences 
in moral dilemmas on the resulting moral judgments of adults. 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects were 61 undergraduate students enrolled 
in the introductory psychology course at Oklahoma State 
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University. Subjects were volunteers who received extra 
credit for participating in the research. An additional 
58 undergraduate students ranked the stories for severity 
of outcome. 
Instrument 
The instrument consisted of a demographic information 
page and five short dilemma stories, each printed on a 
separate page, describing an accident and its consequences. 
The first story, which provided a baseline, was Piaget's 
classic story of the broken cups. 
Sample Story 
John, a five year old boy is playing in 
his room. He is called to dinner. He goes 
to the dining room. Behind the door there is 
a chair, and on the chair is a tray with fifteen 
cups on it. He rushes into the room, bangs the 
tray, and all the cups get chipped or broken. 
Each of the remaining four stories described a different 
accident. Each of these had two outcomes; one was less severe 
(relatively mild) and the other was much more severe. Intentions 
of the main characters in three of the stories were neutral and 
in the fourth story the character's intent was positive. 
Listed below are the four stories, with the mild and severe 
endings. 
Jackie 
Jackie usually stopped on her way to 
work at a convenience store to buy a cup of 
coffee to go. She often left the engine 
running while she went into the store. One 
day while she was in the store the car was 
running, it slipped into gear. The car 
jerked forward and bumped the front of the 
store. 
Mild Ending: Fortunately, no one was hurt 
and there was no damage to the car or store. 
Severe Ending~ The car broke a big glass 
front window of the store and a little girl 
inside the store was cut pretty badly by the 
flying glass. 
Sue 
Sue was on a ladder painting the trim 
on her house. David, her four-year-old-son 9 
was watching her. The phone ran and Sue 
went into the house to answer it. While 
Sue was gone David decided to climb up the 
ladder. 
Mild Ending: The ladder slipped and fell 
spilling Sue's paint. David was splashed 
with paint but unhurt. 
Severe Ending: The ladder slipped and fell, 
spilling Sue's paint and giving David a bad 
bump on the head. 
Mark 
Mark was working on his car one day. 
He poured gasoline into the carburetor 
to get the car started~ 
Mild Ending: As Mark turned on the ignition, 
a spark ignited the gasoline. When the spark 
ignited the gasoline it caused a loud pop that 
scared Mark, but the car started ok, and no 
harm was done. 
Severe Ending: As Mark turned on the ignition, 
a spark ignited the gasoline; the flame set 
the car on fire. Mark was burned putting out 
the fire and the car was almost a total loss. 
Charles 
Charles was fishing in his boat when he 
noticed Todd and Shelly, a friend's children, 
on the shore. He came over and asked if they 
would like to fish with him in the boat. 
Todd and Shelly climbed aboard and Charles 
went to the center of the lake. Not long 
afterward a bad storm began to blow up. Charles 
started to head back to shelter but the storm 
overtook them. The rain and wind caused the 
boat to capsize. Charles called to the children 
to hang onto the boat. 
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Mild Ending: All three clung to the overturned 
boat until they were rescued .. They were scared, 
wet, and cold, but were ok. 
Severe Ending: Even with Charles' help, Todd 
was not able to hahg on. Todd eventually washed 
away from the boat and drowned. 
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The subjects used a 7-point rating scale to respond to 
six opinion statements presented as contrasted pairs (see 
Appendix B ) . Opinion statements were designed to measure 
subject's perception of the actor's: (a) responsibility for 
the accident; (b) intelligence; (c) goodness or badness; 
(d) carelessness; (e) concern for others; and (f) the 
foreseeability of the accident. 
Procedure 
The experimenter was a white female graduate student 
who administered the instrument in one session. Subjects 
participated as a group at a prearranged time in a classroom 
setting. The session took approximately 30 minutes. 
Subjects were asked to read the stories and record their 
opinions on the rating scale. All subjects responded to the 
baseline story and one of two sets of each of the remaining 
four stories. That is, each subject received one of two 
sets of stories in random fashion. Set 1 consisted of the 
Sue and Charles stories with the mild ending and Mark and 
Jackie stories with the severe ending. Set 2 consisted of 
the m i r r o r o f s e t 1 , that i s , the . Sue and Char 1 e s s t o r i e s 
with· the severe ending, and the Mark and Jackie stories 
with the mild ending. Both sets included stories with both 




The dependent variables, responses to opinion statements, 
were scored on a seven-point Likert scale with a score of 
seven representing the harshest, most negative judgment 
and a score of one the least harsh, more positive judgment. 
Rating Severity of Consequence 
In random fashion, half of the 58 additional subjects 
received the four mild ending stories and half the severe 
ending stories. Subjects were asked to rank the stories for 
severity of outcome, a rank of 1 being the most severe and 
4 least severe. 
Results 
Mean rankings of severity of consequences in the more 
severe ending group of stories are presented in Table h 
in Appendix F. The rankings, from most severe to least severe, 
were: (1) Charles, (2).Jackie, (3) Mark, (4) Sue. In the 
mild ending group of stories the rankings were as follows: 
(1) Charles, (2) Sue (3) Jackie (4) Hark. • • Mean rankings 
6£ severity of consequences in the mild ending group of stories 
are presented in Table 2 in Appendix F. A 4X4 Chi square 
analysis was used to assess the frequency by rank and by 
story. Results are presented in Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix F. 
These tests were significant for the severe group, 
29) 156.02, p<.001, and the mild group, 
29) 107.02, p<.OOl. 
An one-way analysis of variance was performed on the 
subjects' responses to the difrerent story endings. No 
significant differences between the two groups were found 
on the baseline story. 1 No main effects were fou~d in 
subjects' responses to the story endings of the Sue or 
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Jackie stories. For the Mark story, a significant difference 
was found for intelligence, ! (1, 59) = 12.49, p<.001, and 
Carelessness, ! (1, 59) = 7.80, p<.007 (see Table 7 in 
Appendix F). Subjects judged Mark to be less intelligent 
and more careless in the severe version of the story. 
Differences between the two versions of the Mark story 
approached significance, ! (1, 59) 3.14, p<.08 (see Table 9 
in Appendix F), with more negative judgments occurring when 
the story had the m6re severe consequence. 
Responses to the Charles story showed significant 
effects for Intelligence, ! (1, 59) = 7.34, p<.01, Carelessness, 
! (1, 59) = 5.85, p<.01, and Foreseeability, ! (1, 59) = 4.83, 
p<.03 (see Table 8 in Appendix p). Charles was judged to be 
less intelligent and more careless, and the outcome was judged 
to be more foreseeable in the more severe version of the 
story. Several nonsignificant trends were also found. In 
the severe version, Charles was judged as more responsible 
for what happened than in the mild ending version,! (1, 59) 
3.68, p<.06. Charles was also judged to be a bad person 
when the story had a severe ending, and a good person when 
the ending was mild, ! (1, 59) = 3.61, p<.06. A significant 
composite effect was also found for the Charles story (see 
Table 9 in Appendix),! (1, 59)= 8.46, p<.OOS. Judgments 
made in response to the severe ending Charles story were 
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much harsher than the judgments made to the mild ending of 
the same story. 
Discussiqn 
The present study demonstrates that consequence can 
affect moral judgments, with more severe consequences 
resulting in more negative judgments. Thus, as hypothesized, 
it appears that adults, like children do not always stay 
at their expected level when making moral judgments. Results 
also show that intent is also taken in to consideration when 
making judgments. It should be noted that Piaget's (1932/1965) 
origina~ conception of negative .intent was rule breaking. 
By that criterion, the three dilemma stories with neutral 
intent would be considered negative intent in the original 
. 
Piagetian view. The Charles character was the only one with 
a truly positive intent and negative consequences, and the 
one where consequences most clearly affected moral judgments. 
However, subjects were responsive to intent, giving more 
positive judgments for the Charles character than for the 
other three. 
The findings of this study and others (Berg-Cross, 1975; 
Chandler, Greenspan, & Barenboim, 1973; Darley, Klosson, & 
Zanna, 1978; Moran & McCullers, 1984; O'Malley, 1986, Walster, 
1966) indicate that both children and adults can be responsive 
to environmental circumstances, resulting in shifts of moral 
judgments. These results present difficulties for Kohlberg's 
conception of homogeneity of moral reasoning stages, and 
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would be more consistent with Piaget's (1932/1965) original 
theory of moral de~elopment. 
Several theorists have suggested possible explanations 
for the occurrence of mixed moral judgments. 
1965) suggests: 
Piaget (1932/ 
It may therefore very well be that in the moral 
sphere there is simply a time-lag between the 
child's concrete evaLuations and his theoretical 
judgment of value, the latter being an adequate 
and progressive conscious realization of the 
former. We shall meet with children who, for 
example, take no account of intentions in appraising 
actions on the verbal plane (objective responsibility), 
but who, when asked for personal experiences, show 
that they take full account of the intentions that 
come into play. It may be that in such cases the 
theoretical simply lags behind the practical moral 
judgment that shows in an adequate manner a stage 
that has been superseded on the plane of action. (p. 117) 
Flavell (1982) proposes that in areas where people have 
had little experience they tend to use more fixed forms of 
reasoning, consistently centering on the most salient aspect 
of the situation. The less experience, the more intellectual 
homogeneity. Thus moral judgments of young children tend to 
be more homogeneous because they have had limited experience. 
A similar theory has been suggested by Elkind (1981). 
Elkind proposes that mental growth occurs by substitution 
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and by integration. When mental growth occurs by substitution 
the old idea is not eradicated, but remains as a potential 
mode of thought with the possibility of re-emergence. 
This may be the case in moral judgments. Elkind (1981) 
has also suggested learning as another explanation. He 
has pointed out that children are very alert to their 
parents' reactions to the ~onsequences of actions, even 
thaugh parents may emphasize intent as the proper basis 
for judging an action. Elkind proposes that children tend 
to center on what their parents do rather than what they 
say. 
Finally, McCullers and his colleagues (Fabes, McCullers, 
and Moran, 1985; McCullers, Fabes, & Moran, 1987; Moran, 
McCullers, & Fabes, 1984) have proposed that material rewards 
may produce developmental regression. Recently, O'Malley 
(1986) has shown that rewards can produce regression in 
moral reasoning. Other environmental circumstances, such 
as severe consequences, might touch an emotional chord, 
something like the regression under material reward, and allow 
old modes of moral reasoning to emerge. 
The present findings and this discussion have not been 
offered as a refutation of Kohlberg's general theory of moral 
development. They do, however, suggest that researchers may 
find it fruitful to reexamine Piaget's (1932/1965) original 
views of stage homogeneity in moral development. 
16 
References 
Berg-Cross, L. G. (1975). Intentionality, degree of damage, 
and moral judgments. Child Development, ~. 970-974. 
Chandler, M. J., Greenspan, S., & Barenboim, C. (1973). 
Judgments of intentionality in response to videotaped 
and verbally presented moral dilemmas: The medium is 
the message. Child Development, ~. 315-320. 
Darley, J. M., Klosson, E. c. & Zanna, M. P. (1978). 
Intentions and their contexts in the moral judgments of 
children and adults. Child Development, ~. 66-74. 
Elkind, D. (1981). Children and adolescents: Interpretive 
essays on Jean Piaget. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Elkind, D. & Dabek, R. (1977). Personal injury and property 
damage in the moral judgments of children. 
Development, ~' 518-522. 
Child 
Fabes, R. A., McCullers, J. c., & Moran, J.D., III. (1985). 
Effects of material rewards on inkblot perception and 
organization. American Journal of Psychology, ~. 
399-407. 
Flavell, J. H. (1982). Structures, stages, and sequence in 
cognitive development. In W. Andrew Collins (Ed.), 
The concept of development: The Minnesota symposia on 
child psychology Vol. 15 (pp.1-28). Hillsdale, N.J~: 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-
developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin 
17 
(Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research 
(pp.· 347-480). Chicago: Rand-McNally. 
McCullers, J. C., Fabes, R. A., & Moran, J.D., III (1987). 
Does intrinsic motivation theory explain the adverse 
effects of rewards ~n immediate task performance? 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, g, 1027-
1033. 
Moran, J.D., III, & McCullers, J. C. (1984). The effects 
of recency and story content on children's moral judgments. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, ~. 447-455. 
Moran, J.D., III, & McCullers, J. C., & Fabes, R. A. (1984). 
A developmental analysis _of the effects of reward on 
selected Wechsler subscales. 
Psyc~ology, ~. 205-214. 
American Journal of 
Moran, J.D., III, & O'Brien, G. (1983a). The development 
of intention-based moral judgments in three- and four-
year old children. 
143, 175-179. 
The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 
Moran, J.D., III, & O'Brien, G. (1983b). Influence of 
structured group experience on moral judgments of 
preschoolers. Psychological Reports, g, 587-593. 
O'Malley, A. J. (1986). Paradoxical regression in moral 
reasoning in college student subjects: Artifact of ----------------------
material reward. Unpublished doctoral dissertation: 
Oklahoma State University. 
Piaget, J. (1932/1965). The moral judgment of the child. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace. 
18 
Shultz, T. R,., Wright, K., Schleifer, M. (1986). Assignment 
of moral responsibilities and punishment. 
Development, ~. 177-.184. 
Child 
Suls, J., Gutkin, D., Kalle, R. J. (1979). The role of 
intentions, damage, and social consequences in the moral 
judgments of children. Child Development, ~. 874-877. 
Walster, E. (1966). Assignment of responsibility for an 




1An analysis of covariance, using scores from the 
baseline (John) story as a covariant, was also performed. 
However, because initial differences between the two groups 
on the John story were very small, the analysis of covariance 





REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Moral Judgment 
The Cognitive Developmental Approach 
Piaget (1932/1965) posed hypothetical moral problems 
to children and then observed how the children formulated 
a solution. These interviews with children revealed to 
Piaget differences between the young child's and older 
child's thinking in the areas of obedience, authority, 
rules, punishment, and immanent justice. Based on these 
observations, Piaget suggested that there are fundamental 
transformations in the organization of people's thought 
in respect to moral.reasoning. The structure of moral 
thinking is reorganized and changed through cognitive 
maturation and social interaction. As the child develops 
an understanding of the social world, the.underlying moral 
judgment changes. 
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Piaget (1932/1965) speakes of two broad stages of moral 
development: moral realism and moral autonomy. In the 
first stage the young child bases moral judgments on the 
consequences of actions. Through cognitive development and 
social experience with peers a transformation to intention 
based judgments occur at about seven years of age. Pia get 
views moral development as establishing social equilibrium 
or reciprocal justice by individuals interacting with each 
22 
other. In Piaget's (1932/1965) system there are successive 
phases of mental processes recurring on different planes of 
behavior and consciousness. Piaget does not speak of global 
or inclusive stages characterized by heteronomy, but does 
speak of phases of heteronomy which define a process that is 
repeated for each new plane of thought. 
Kohlberg (1958) expanded Piaget's cognitive developmental 
theory of moral development by describing the transformations 
in the organization of thought from childhood through adulthood. 
Kohlberg (1981) describes three broad levels in this theory of 
moral development: preconventional, conventional, and post 
conventional. At the preconventional level rules and social 
expectations are external; at the conventional level the 
rules and expectations of others have been internalized; 
and at the post conventional level rules and expectations 
of others have been differentiated and self-chosen principles 
defined. Within these three levels are six stages that 
Kohlberg suggests show the patterns of'development in moral 
reasoning across the lifespan. Kohlberg's conception of 
stages is one in which individuals move one step at a time 
through the stage sequence with movement always in the same 
order and always upward. This implies that there are periods 
of development in which a given stage is predominant. The 
only kind of stage mixture would b~ between adjacent stages 
and with only two stages of mix at a time. Kohlberg's (1969) 
theory is one in which each stage represents an organized, 
homogeneous system of thought. 
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The studies on which Kohlberg's theory (1981) is based 
consist of presenting moral dilemma stories to subjects 
and asking them to indicate what solution would be best and 
why. Responses were analyzed to determine which of the six 
developmental stages reflected the subjects' answers. 
Kohlberg's longitudinal study of fifty boys over a 20 year 
time span tends to support his six stage model of moral 
development. Research (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Rest, 1975) 
showing that older subjects exhibit higher stages of 
reasoning than younger subjects also supports the develomental 
stage model of moral judgment. 
Research studies (Walster, 1966; Flavell, 1982; O'Malley, 
1986) showing that subjects tend to change their moral 
judgments depending on environmental circumstances, at times 
making judgments based on consequence and at other times 
on intent, challenge Kohlberg's assumption of homogeneity 
of stages. 
Walster's (1966) experiment manipulated severity of 
consequences in an accidental happening. Subj~cts were asked 
to r~te the responsibility of a story character for an accident. 
The accident had four different outcomes: inconsequential 
damage; considerable damage; possible injury to a person; 
and considerable injury to a person. Subjects listened to 
a tape recorded description of the accident and then expressed 
their opinions concerning assignment of responsibility 
including moral responsibility. Results showed that judgments 
were dependent upon the severity of the consequences. 
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Significa~tly more responsibility was assigned to the story 
character for accidents with severe consequences than for 
mild consequences. Subjects were also found to apply stricter 
moral standards of judgment to the characters behavior when 
the accidental consequences were severe. However, Shaver 
(1970) was unable to replicate the findings of the Walster 
(1966) study. 
O'Malley found that adult subjects' judgments tended 
to change under conditions of material reward. A regression 
in moral reasoning occurred under reward conditions but 
not under nonreward. Subjects' moral reasoning seems to be 
sensitive to the influence of material reward. 
Chandler, Greenspan, & Barenboim (1973) presented 
children moral dilemmas either verbally or video taped. 
Moral judgments made in response to the verbal dilemmas 
were more often based on consequence. However, responses 
to the videotaped dilemmas were largely based on intention. 
The medium or presentation of the dilemma seemed to effect 
the moral reasoning and resulting judgments of the children. 
Moran and McCullers (1984) investigated the effects 
of story content and recency on development of moral reasoning 
In stories involving physical injury with either positive 
or negative intention no recency effects were found. However, 
recency significantly influenced the ratings of the characters 
in all of the other stories. Childrens use of intent 
information changed when personal injury was involved resulting 
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in more negative judgments. It appears that physical injury 
is a salient feature in moral dilemmas and possibly affecting 
judgments of subjects at all ages. 
Moran & O'Brien (1983) investigated the effects of 
group experiences on preschoolers moral judgments. Findings 
suggest that the social environment influences young 
children's moral judgments. Group-care children showed 
sign~ficantly more intention based judgments than children 
at home for stories involving personal injury to a person 
and a trend for consequence-based judgments for stories 
concerned with personal property. 
In another study, Elkind and Dabek (1977) found that 
more intention based judgments were made by kindergarten 
children when the stories involved injury to another person. 
Research by Berg-Cross (1975) found severe consequences 
elicited harsher judgments regardless of intentionality. 
Berg-Cross interpreted this finding to mean that an extreme 
consequence may be used as an additional weighted factor that 
combines with other factors to influence moral reasoning and 
resulting judgments. 
In other related research, Hoffman and Salzstein (1967) 
found that the use of physical punishment. deprivation of 
privileges or material objects or application of force or 
threat of any of these by the mother was associated with 
weak moral development. The use of induction by the mother 
was associated with advanced moral development. 
Hoffman (1970, 1975) has also suggested a close link 
between parental discipline and altruistic behavior in 
children. Other researchers (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, 
26 
& King, 1979) have found that mothers who explained how their 
children's actions affected others and who did so in an 
affective tone, had children who were altruistic. 
The findings of the present study and those of others 
suggest that further investigations should focus on 
circumstantes or contexts that elicit certain types.of moral 
judgments rather than on stage sequence. Such studies 
should not only investigate story contexts but also methods 
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In this questionnaire you will be asked to give your 
opinion~ about several stories. The stories are designed to 
explore what people think about other people and their problems. 
There are no "right" or "wrong• answers, Your answers will be 
anonymous, do not put your name on the questionnaire. However, we 
ask that you give us some information about yourself. This 
information will be used to help us learn if people think 
differently about these stories because of being male or female, 
or be~ause of their age, marital status, etc. Thank you for your 
cooperation. 
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
Sex: ______________ _ Race: ______________ _ 
Year of Birth: ______________ _ Pla~e of Birth: ______________ _ 
Number of Brothers: _______________ Sisters: ______________ _ 
Your Birth Order !e.g., youngest, 2nd oldest, etc.>: ____________ _ 
Years of Education: Your Father __________ Your Mother _________ _ 
Pla~e Where Yo~ Grew Up (e.g., rural, small town, large city, etc.>: 
lapprox. population, if known) 
Your Marital Status: ________________ Number of Children: _______ _ 
Your Employment Status=---------------------------
Your College Major=-------------------------------
Your College Class Rank <Freshman, Sophomore, et~.>=--------------
Politi~al Party Preference: ______________________ _ 
Actively Involved in Political Party Work? ________ _ 
Church Preference or Affiliation: _________________ _ 
Actively Involved in Church? ______________________ _ 
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SAMPLE STORY 
John, a five year old boy is playing in his room. He is 
called to dinner. He goes to the dining room. Behind the door 
there is a chair, and on the chair is a tray with fifteen cups on 
it. He rushes into the room, bangs the tray, and all the cups get 
chipped or broken. 
Opinion Statements: 
For each statement, mark the box that is closest to youo· 
opinion. For example, if you agree with the lefthand statement, 
mark the box on the far left. If you agree with the statement on 
the right, mark the box on the far right. Use the boxes in 
between to show an intermediate opinion. 
John is nat John is entirely 
responsible far responsible far 
what happened. [ J [ J [ ] [ ) [ J [ l [ ) what happened. 
John is very John is not 
intelligent. [ ) [ ] [ ] r ) [ ] [ l [ ) in tel Ugent. 
John is a John is a bad 
good bay. [ l r l [ l r ] [ ] [ ] boy. 
John is John is not 
careless. [ ] [ l [ l [ ] [ l ( ] careless. 
What happened 
What happened was due to 
could have been fate or chance 
foreseen and and couldn't 
avoided. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ l r· l ( ] [ l be avoided. 
John is John has con-
self-centered. [ l [ l ( J [ l [ J ( ] [ J cern for others. 
32 
Jackie 
Jackie usually stopped on her way to work at a convenience 
store to buy a cup of coffee to go. She often left the engine 
running while she went into the store. One day while she was in 
the store and the car was running, it slipped into gear. The car 
jerked forward and bumped the front of the store. Fortunately, no 
one waG hurt and there was no damage to the car or the store. 
Opinion Statements! 
For each statement, mark the boM that is closest to your 
opinion. 
Jackie is not 
responsible for 
Jackie is entirely 
responsible for 
what happened. [ l [ J C J C J [ l [ ] C l what happened. 
Jackie is very 
intelligent. C l C J C J C J 
Jackie is not 
C J C J C J intelligent. 










Jackie is a bad 
[ l [ l ( l [ J [ J [ l [ l woman. 
Jackie is not 
[ J [ l [ l [ l [ l C l [ l careless. 
What happened 
was due to 
fate or chance 
and couldn't 
[ J [ ] [ l [ ] [ l [ ] [ l be avoided, 
Jackie has con-
[ l ( l c ] [ ] c J c ] . [ l cer·n for others. 
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Jackie 
Jackie usually stopped on he~ way to wo~k at a convenience 
store to buy a cup of coffee to go. She often left the engine 
running while she went into the store. One day while she was in 
thQ store and the car was running, it slipped into gear. The car 
je~ked forward and crashed into the front of the store. The car 
broke a big glass front window of the store and a little girl 
inside the store was cut pretty badly by the flying glass • 
Opinion Statements: 
For each statement, mark the bo>< that is closest to your 
opinion. 
Jackie is not Jackie is entirely 
responsible for responsible for 
what happened. [ J [ l [ l [ l [ l [ ] [ ] what happened. 
Jackie is very Jackie is not 
intelligent. [ l [ ] [ l [ l [ ] [ l [ ] intelligent. 
Jackie is a Jackie is a bad 
good woman. [ l [ ] [ l [ l [ ] [ ] [ J woman. 
Jackie is Jackie is not 
careless. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ l [ ] careless. 
What happened 
What happened was due to 
could have been fate or chance 
foreseen and and couldn't 
avoided. r ] [ ] [ ] [ l [ l r l [ ] be avoided, 
Jackie is Jackie has con-
self-centered. [ ] [ l [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ l cern for others. 
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Sue 
Sue was on a ladder painting the trim on her house. David, 
her four-year-old-son, was watching her. The phone rang and Sue 
went into the house to answer it. While Sue was gone David 
decided to climb up the ladder. The ladder slipped and fell, 
spilling Sue's paint, David was splashed with paint but unhurt. 
Opinion Statements: 
For each statement, mark the bO)( that is closest to your 
opinion. 
Sue is not Sue is entirely 
responsible for responsible for 
what happened. [ l [ l [ J [ J [ l J [ l what happened. 
Sue is very Sue is not 
in tell iqent. [ J [ l [ l [ J [ l [ ] intelligent. 
Sue is a Sue is a bad 
good woman. [ ] [ J [ l [ J [ ] [ l woman. 
Sua is Sue is not 
careless. [ J [ ] [ J [ J [ J [ l [ J careless. 
What happened 
What happened was due to 
could have been fate or chance 
foreseen and and couldn't 
avoided. [ J [ ] [ l [ ] [ ] [ J [ ] be avoided. 
Sue is Sue has con-
self·-centered. [ l [ J [ J [ ] [ J [ ] cern for others. 
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Sue 
Sue was on a ladder painting the trim on her house. David, 
her four-year-old-son, was watching her. The phone rang and Sue 
went into the house to answer it. While Sue was gone David 
decided to climb up the ladder. The ladder slipped and fell, 
spilling Sue's paint and giving David a bad bump on the head. 
Opinion Statements: 
For each statement, mar.k the box that is closest to your 
opinion. 
Sue is not Sue is entirely 
responsible for responsible for 
what happened. [ ] [ J [ J [ ] [ J [ ] [ ] what happened. 
Sue is very Sue is not 
intelligent. [ ] [ ] r ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] intelligent. 
Sue i!:. a Sue is a bad 
good woman. [ ] r J [ J [ J [ ] [ J [ J woman. 
Sue is Sue is not 
careless. [ ] [ J [ J [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] careless. 
What happened 
What happened was duao to 
could have been fate or chance 
foreseen and and couldn't 
avoidaod. [ ] [ ] [ J [ ] [ J [ ] [ ] be avoided. 
Sua i!i Sue has con-
self·-centered, [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J [ J [ J [ ] cern for others. 
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Charies 
Charles was fishing in his boat when he noticed Todd and 
Shelly, a friend's children, on the shore. He came over and asked 
if they would like to fish with him in the boat. Todd and Shelly 
climbed aboard and Charles went to the center of the lake. Not 
long afterward a bad storm began to blow up. Charles started to 
head back to shelter but the storm overtook them. The rain and 
wind caused the boat t~ capsize. Charles called to the children 
to hang onto the boat. All three clung to the overturned boat 
until they were rescued. They were scared, wet, and cold, but 
~~era ok. 
Opinion Statements: 
For each statement, mark the box that is closest to yOU I" 
opinion. 
Chad es is not Charles is entirely 
responsible! for responsible for 
what happened. [ ] [ J [ J [ ] [ l [ J [ l what happened. 
Charle,; is very Charles is not 
intelligent. [ J [ J ( J [ ] [ ] [ l [ ] intelligent. 
Charle!> i!3 a Charles is a bad 
good man. [ J [ ] [ ] [ J ( J [ l [ J man. 
Charles is Charles is not 
careless. [ l [ ] [ J [ l [ ] [ ] [ ] careless. 
1-Jhat happened 
What happened was due to 
could have been fate or chance 
foreseen and and couldn't 
avoided. [ ] [ J [ ] [ ] [ J [ J [ J be avoided. 
Charles i!i Charles has con-
se 1 f·-centered. [ ] [ J [ J c l [ ] [ J [ ] cern for others. 
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Charles 
Charles was fishing in his boat when he noticed Todd and 
Shelly, a friend's children, on the shore. He came over and asked 
if they would like to fish with him in the boat. Todd and Shelly 
climbed aboard and Charles went to the center of the lake. Not 
long afterward a bad storm began to bl~w up. Charles started to 
head back to shelter but the storm overtook them. The rain and 
wind caused the boat to capsize. Charles called to the children 
to hang onto the boat, Even with Charles' help, Todd was not able 
to hang on. Todd eventually washed away from the boat and 
dro1~ned. 
ppinion Statements: 
For each statement, mark the box that is closest to your 
opinion. 
Charles is not Charles is entirely 
responsible for responsible for 
what happened. [ ] [ ] [ J [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J what happened. 
Charle!:i is very Charles is not 
intelligent. [ J [ J [ J [ J [ J [ J [ J intelligent. 
Charle!l is a Charles is a bad 
good man. [ J [ ] [ J [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] man. 
Charles is Charles is not 
ca1·eless. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J [ ] [ ] [ ] careless. 
What happened 
What happened was due to 
could have been fate or chance 
foreseen and and couldn't 
avoided. [ ] [ J [ ] [ J [ J [ J [ J be avoided. 
Charles is Charles has con-




Mark was working on his car one day. He poured gasoline into 
the carburetor to get the car started. As Mark turned on the 
ignition, a spark ignited the gasoline. ~Jhen the spark ignited 
the gasoline, it caused a loud pop that scared Mark, but The car 
started Ol<, and no harm was done. 
Opinion Statements: 
For each statement, mark the boM that is closest to your 
opinion. 
Mark is not Mark is entirely 
responsible for responsible for 
what happened. r ] [ ] r ] ( ] [ ] [ ] [ ] what happened. 
Mark is very Mark is not 
intelligent. [ J [ J [ ] [ ] . r ] r ] [ ] intelligent. 
Mark is a Mark is a bad 
good man. [ ] r ] r ] [ ] [ ] [ J r ] man • 
Mark .is Mark is not 
careless. [ ] r ] [ ] [ J ( ] [ J careless. 
What happened 
~lha t happened was due to 
could have been fate or chance 
foreseen and and couldn't 
avoided. [ ] ( ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] be avoided. 
Mark is Mark has con-
s:elf-centered. [ ] [ ] r ] [ ] [ ] r ] r J cern for others. 
Mark 
Mark was working on his car one day. He poured gasoline into 
the carburetor to get the car started, As Mark turned on the 
ignition, a spark ignited the gasoline; the flame set the car on 
fire, Mark was burned putting out the fire and the car was almost 
a total loss. 
Opinion Statements: 
For each statement, mark the box that is closest to your 
opinion. 
Mark is not 
r~sponsible for 
••ha t happened. [ l C l [ l [ l [ l C J 
Marl< is very 
intelligent. [ ] [ l [ ] [ ] [ J [ ] 
Mark is a 
good man. [ l [ ] [ l [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Mark is 
ca•·eless. [ ] [ ] [ J [ ] [ J [ l 
What happened 
could have been 
foreseen and 
avoided. [ l [ l [ J [ l [ l [ l 
Mark i~ 
sel f·-centered. [ J [ l [ l [ ] r J [ l 
Mark is entirely 
responsible for 
[ l what happened. 
Mark is not 
[ ] intelligent. 
Mark is a bad 
[ ] man. 
Mark is not 
[ l careless. 
What happened 
was due to 
fate or chance 
and couldn't 
[ l be avoided. 
Mark has con-






V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 VB V9 V10 v 11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 
1 1 4 1 5 5 4 6 6 3 5 5 3 6 7 3 7 7 1 
2 1 4 1 2 4 5 5 5 4 7 4 4 6 6 4 5 5 4 
3 1 4 1 6 4 4 4 2 4 6 5 3 6 7 4 7 5 2 
4 1 4 1 1 4 1 1 4 1 6 4 4 3 7 4 2 •4 4 
5 1 4 1 3 4 4 5 3 4 2 4 4 5 6 4 6 7 4 
6 1 4 1 6 6 1 7 7 6 5 5 4 6 7 4 6 4 4 
'7 1 4 1 1 4 4 2 1 4 6 5 4 6 7 3 1 4 4 
8 1 4 1 5 3 4 6 2 4 5 4 4 6 2 4 6 5 4 
9 1 4 1 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 6 7 4 5 4 4 
10 1 4 1 1 3 3 2 5 4 7 5 4 5 7 5 7 4 4 
11 1 4 1 3 4 3 4 5 5 1 3 1 5 4 3 4 3 3 
12 1 4 1 2 4 4 5 7 4 2 5 3 6 6 4 7 7 4 
13 1 4 1 2 4 4 4 7 4 5 4 4 6 7 4 7 6 4 
14 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 7 4 7 7 4 6 1 1 
15 1 4 1 4 2 3 5 4 4 7 2 2 6 7 4 2 2 2 
16 1 4 1 3 6 2 5 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 6 4 1 
17 1 4 1 1 1 1 7 7 1 7 7 1 7 7 1 1 1 1 
18 2 4 1 2 4 2 2 7 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 6 4 4 
19 2 4 1 3 4 2 2 3 3 3 4 2 5 6 3 7 6 2 
20 2 4 1 6 5 4 3 1 2 4 2 6 6 3 2 7 6 4 
21 2 4 1 4 4 4 6 6 4 3 6 4 7 7 4 7 6 2 
22 2 4 1 1 4 7 7 7 4 7 6 4 7 7 6 1 5 4 
23 2 4 1 4 3 3 4 5 5 6 5 4 5 7 5 7 5 4 
24 2 4 1 5 3 3 7 6 4 6 3 3 6 6 3 7 6 4 
25 2 4 1 2 4 4 5 7 4 5 4 3 6 6 3 6 5 4 
26 2 4 1 5 3 3 3 5 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 5 3 3 
27 2 4 1 3 4 4 4 7 4 6 4 4 5 7 4 5 4 4 
28 2 4 1 2 4 4 3 1 4 5 4 4 5 7 4 7 7 4 
29 2 3 1 4 4 4 4 7 4 6 4 4 5 7 4 6 4 4 
30 2 3 1 7 4 4 5 3 5 3 4 4 5 7 2 7 6 3 
31 2 4 1 3 4 4 3 1 4 4 5 3 5 6 4 7 7 4 
32 1 4 2 5 4 4 6 5 4 6 5 4 6 7 3 7 4 4 
33 1 4 2 3 4 4 6 2 4 3 5 4 6 6 4 6 4 4 
34 1 1 2 3 4 4 5 6 5 5 4 4 5 6 4 7 5 4 
35 1 4 2 2 2 2 5 6 5 5 4 3 5 7 4 5 3 1 
36 1 4 2 3 4 4 4 7 4 6 5 4 3 6 4 2 3 4 
37 1 3 2 5 4 4 6 5 5 6 5 4 7 7 5 7 5 4 
38 1 1 2 1 4 4 5 7 4 5 4 4 5 3 4 5 4 4 
39 1 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 5 3 5 3 7 3 2 2 1 
40 1 3 2 3 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 6 4 7 4 4 
41 1 3 2 1 3 4 1 3 4 6 5 4 5 6 4 7 2 4 
42 1 4 2 4 4 4 4 3 4 6 6 4 7 7 4 4 4 3 
43 1 4 2 1 4 4 4 1 4 5 4 4 4 6 4 1 4 4 
44 1 4 2 5 4 4 4 2 4 6 5 4 5 7 4 7 4 4 
45 1 4 2 1 1 7 1 7 1 7 7 1 7 7 1 7 1 1 
46 1 4 2 6 4 4 6 6 4 5 4 4 6 7 4 1 4 4 
47 1 3 2 5 4 4 5 7 4 7 4 4 7 7 4 7 4 4 
48 2 3 2 1 3 3 5 5 3 1 4 4 7 7 2 1 1 4 
49 2 4 2 2 4 4 5 7 4 7 5 4 6 7 4 6 4 4 
50 2 4 2 3 4 4 3 4 4 5 5 4 5 6 5 5 4 2 
51 2 4 2 4 5 2 6 6 4 6 6 3 6 6 5 7 5 2 
52 2 4 2 5 4 2 5 4 4 4 3 3 6 6 5 5 3 3 
53 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 7 3 2 
54 2 4 2 1 4 4 4 1 4 1 6 4 7 7 4 7 4 4 
55 2 4 2 5 4 2 4 4 4 5 3 3 5 7 5 7 2 2 
56 2 4 2 3 4 2 5 1 2· 6 5 4 3 6 3 1 1 2 
57 2 4 2 3 4 4 5 2 4 5 4 2 5 3 4 6 4 4 
58 2 1 2 4 4 4 6 7 4 f 4 4 5 7 4 7 4 4 
59 2 1 2 2 4 4 4 2 4 7 7 4 7 7 4 1 5 4 
60 2 4 2 f 4 4 4 7 4 6 4 4 6 7 5 7 2 4 
61 2 2 2 2 4 2 4 4 4 6 5 4 5 6 4 2 4 4 
43 
V1 V20 V21 V22 V23 V24 V25 V26 V27 V28 V29 V30 V31 V32 V33 V34 
1 7 7 4 7 7 1 7 7 6 7 5 1 7 7 3 
2 6 5 4 2 2 3 4 1 2 6 4 4 6 6 4 
3 7 7 4 2 3 3 5 5 4 7 6 4 7 7 4 
4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 1 6 6 4 6 7 4 
5 7 7 4 4 3 3 4 2 1 6 5 4 6 7 4 
6 6 7 4 1 4 2 5 5 4 2 3 ·3 7 7 4 
7 2 1 4 1 4 4 1 1 4 7 7 5 7 7 4 
8 6 7 4 5 3 2 5 2 1 2 5 4 5 5 4 
9 5 6 4 1 3 4 3 3 4 5 4 4 3 3 4 
10 6 7 4 2 3 2 3 5 1 7 5 4 5 7 4 
11 3 5 4 4 4 5 2 6 4 7 6 4 7 6 4 
12 7 7 4 1 1 1 2 1 1 7 7 4 7 7 5 
13 7 7 6 1 2 3 2 2 1 6 5 4 7 7 7 
14 7 1 6 7 7 4 6 6 5 7 6 1 7 7 5 
15 4 3 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 6 4 4 7 7 4 
16 6 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 7 7 3 6 7 6 
17 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 1 
18 3 2 4 1 3 3 4 2 1 6 6 4 6 7 5 
19 6 4 3 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 5 3 7 2 4 
20 2 6 5 2 5 2 4 5 4 7 6 3 3 7 2 
21 7 7 4 6 6 2 3 2 3 7 6 4 7 7 4 
22 4 6 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 6 5 7 7 7 
23 7 7 4 6 4 3 5 6 4 7 5 4 7 7 7 
24 7 7 4 5 5 2 6 7 2 7 6 2 7 7 2 
25 5 6 4 6 4 3 5 4 3 5 4 4 5 5 4 
26 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 
27 5 3 4 5 3 3 4 4 4 6 3 3 5 7 4 
28 7 7 4 6 6 4 2 6 3 7 7 4 7 7 4 
29 5 3 4 7 6 4 6 7 5 7 5 4 5 7 4 
30 7 7 4 5 4 6 5 2 5 7 7 4 7 7 6 
31 7 7 6 1 1 1 3 2 4 6 5 2 5 7 5 
32 5 5 4 6 5 4 4 6 4 5 5 4 6 6 4 
33 5 6 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 7 5 4 6 6 4 
34 7 7 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 7 5 4 5 6 4 
35 6 5 4 6 3 2 2 2 2 6 6 3 6 5 4 
36 4 5 4 5 4 3 5 3 4 2 3 4 6 3 4 
37 6 6 4 3 4 3 5 5 2 7 5 4 6 7 4 
38 5 5 4 5 5 3 5 3 3 7 4 4 7 7 5 
39 1 2 1 6 5 2 6 6 3 5 3 3 3 3 1 
40 6 7 4 4 5 4 3 3 4 7 4 4 7 7 5 
41 4 5 4 3 5 4 5 5 4 7 5 4 3 6 4 
42 5 6 4 2 2 4 4 2 4 4 5 4 6 7 4 
43 2 7 4 6 5 4 3 7 4 6 4 4 2 7 4 
44 5 6 4 6 5 4 5 2 4 7 6 4 5 7 4 
45 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 7 1 1 7 1 7 7 1 
46 4 2 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 7 6 4 7 7 4 
47 4 7 4 4 4 1 4 4 1 7 4 4 7 7 7 
48 2 1 4 7 7 5 7 7 5 7 7 4 7 7 7 
49 6 7 4 6 6 4 6 3 2 6 4 4 7 7 4 
50 3 6 5 6 6 4 6 7 3 7 6 4 6 7 6 
51 6 6 5 7 3 2 4 3 5 7 7 5 7 7 5 
52 4 3 3 3 3 2 4 3 2 7 6 4 6 7 5 
53 2 2 4 1 4 2 4 7 4 7 6 4 6 7 4 
54 4 7 4 2 4 4 6 6 4 7 5 4 7 7 4 
55 6 7 5 6 5 2 6 7 2 3 4 3 4 5 4 
56 2 1 4 7 7 5 7 6 6 4 4 4 4 1 4 
57 6 6 4 2 2 2 2 6 2 7 4 4 7 7 4 
58 7 7 4 7 4 4 6 7 4 7 4 4 7 7 4 
59 5 5 4 5 4 4 3 5 4 7 6 4 7 7 4 
60 5 6 4 1 5 4 6 1 1 3 4 4 6 5 4 
61 4 2 4 2 4 4 4 2 4 6 6 4 6 6 4 
44 
V1 JOHN SUE MARK CHARLES JACKIE 
1 29.00 29.00 33.00 35.00 30.00 
2 25.00 31.00 29.00 14.00 30.00 
3 24.00 31.00 32.00 22.00 35.00 
4 12.00 28.00 22.00 15.00 33.00 
5 23.00 25.00 35.00 17.00 32.00 
6 33.00 31.00 31 .00 21 .00 26.00 
7 16.00 31.00 16.00 15.00 37.00 
8 24.00 25.00 32.00 18.00 25.00 
9 23.00 30.00 28.00 18.00 23.00 
10 18.00 33.00 32.00 16.00 32.00 
11 24.00 17.00 22.00 25.00 34.00 
12 26.00 26.00 36.00 7.00 37.00 
13 25.00 30.00 37.00 11.00 36.00 
14 6.00 36.00 22.00 35.00 33.00 
15 22.00 28.00 17.00 7.00 32.00 
16 20.00 12.00 21.00 8.00 36.00 
17 18.00 30.00 12.00 6.00 36.00 
18 21 .00 28.00 23.00 14.00 34.00 
19 17.00 23.00 28.00 9.00 23.00 
20 21.00 23.00 30.00 22.00 28.00 
21 28.00 31.00 33.00 22.00 35.00 
22 30.00 37.00 24.00 6.00 39.00 
23 24.00 32.00 34.00 28.00 37.00 
24 28.00 27.00 35.00 27.00 31.00 
25 26.00 27.00 30.00 25.00 27.00 
26 23.00 23.00 23.00 20.00 25.00 
27 26.00 30.00 25.00 23.00 28.00 
28 18.00 29.00 36.00 27.00 36.00 
29 27.00 30.00 26.00 35.00 32.00 
30 28.00 25.00 34.00 27.00 38.00 
31 19.00 27.00 38.00 12.00 30.00 
32 28.00 31.00 29.00 29.00 30.00 
33 23.00 28.00 29.00 23.00 32.00 
34 27.00 28.00 34.00 27.00 31 .00 
35 22.00 28.00 24.00 17.00 30.00 
36 26.00 28.00 22.00 24.00 22.00 
37 29.00 34.00 32.00 22.00 33.00 
38 25.00 25.00 27.00 24.00 34.00 
39 11.00 26.00 9.00 28.00 18.00 
40 25.00 28.00 32.00 23.00 34.00 
41 16.00 30.00 26.00 26.00 29.00 
42 23.00 34.00 26.00 18.00 30.00 
43 18.00 27.00 22.00 29.00 27.00 
44 23.00 31.00 30.00 26.00 33.00 
45 18.00 30.00 12.00 18.00 24.00 
46 30.00 30.00 19.00 18.00 35.00 
47 29.00 33.00 30.00 18.00 36.00 
48 20.00 25.00 13.00 38.00 39.00 
49 26.00 33.00 31.00 27.00 32.00 
50 22.00 30.00 25.00 32.00 36.00 
51 27.00 32.00 31,00 24.00 38.00 
52 24.00 27.00 21 .00 17.00 35.00 
53 24.00 25.00 20.00 22.00 34.00 
54 18.00 29.00 30.00 26.00 34.00 
55 23.00 28.00 29.00 28.00 23.00 
56 17.00 27.00 11 .00 38.00 21.00 
57 22.00 23.00 30.00 16.00 33.00 
58 29.00 25.00 33.00 32.00 33.00 
59 20.00 36.00 30.00 25.00 35.00 
60 24.00 32.00 28.00 18.00 26.00 






V2 1 'FEMALE' 2 'MALE'/ V3 1 '40-47' 2 '48-54' 3 '55-61' 
4 '62-68'/ V4 1 'SET1' 2 'SET2'/ V5 1 'NOTRESP' 2 'LITTLE' 3 
'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'RESPONSIBLE'/ 
V6 1 'SMART' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 
6 'LITTLE' 
7 'NOTSMART'/ V7 1 'GOOD' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 
5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'BAD'/ VS 1 'NOTCARELESS' 2 'LITTLE' 
3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'CARELESS'/ 
V9 1 'NOTFORESEEABLE' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 
5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'FORESEEABLE'/ V10 1 'CONCERNED' 
2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 
7 'NOTCONCERNED'/ V11 1 'NOTRESPONSIBLE' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 
4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'RESPONSIBLE'/ V12 
1 'SMART' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 
6 'LITTLE' 7 'NOTSMART'/ V13 1 'GOOD' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 
4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'BAD'/ V14 1 'NOTCARELESS' 
2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 
7 'CARELESS'/ V15 1 'NOTFORESEEABLE' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 
4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'FORESEEABLE'/ 
V16 1 'CONCERNED' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 
5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'NOTCONCERNED'/ V17 1 'NOTRESPONSIBLE' 
2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 
7 'RESPONSIBLE'/ V18 1 'SMART' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOME' 4 'NEUTRAL' 
5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'NOTSMART'/ V19 1 'GOOD' 2 'LITTLE' 
3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'BAD'/ 
V20 1 'NOT~ARELESS' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 
5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'CARELESS'/ V21 1 'NOTFORESEEABLE' 
2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 
7 'FORESEEABLE'/ V22 1 'CONCERNED' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 
4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'NOTCONCERNED'/ 
V23 1 'NOTRESPONSIBLE' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 
5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 RESPONSIBLE'/ V24 1 'SMART' 
2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 
7 'NOTSMART'/ V25 1 'GOOD' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 
5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'BAD'/ V26 1 'NOTCARELESS' 2 'LITTLE' 
3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'CARELESS'/ 
V27 1 'NOTFORESEEABLE' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 
5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'FORESEEABLE'/ V28 1 'CONCERNED' 
2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 
7 'NOTCONCERNED'/ V29 1 'NOTRESPONSIBLE' 2 'LITTLE' 
3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'RESPONSIBLE' 
I V30 1 'SMART' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 
5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'NOTSMART'/ V31 1 'GOOD' 2 'LITTLE' 
3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'BAD'/ 
V32 1 'NOTCARELESS' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 
5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'CARELESS'/ V33 1 'NOTFORESEEABLE' 
2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 
7 'FORESEEABLE'/ V34 1 'CONCERNED' 2 'LITTLE' 3 'SOMEWHAT' 
4 'NEUTRAL' 5 'SOMEWHAT' 6 'LITTLE' 7 'NOTCONCERNED'/ 
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APPENDIX E 
SELECTED STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
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V A R I A N C E * * * 
MEAN SIGNIF 
OF SQUARE F OF F 
460.828 8.462 0.005 
460.828 8.462 0.005 









Mean Rankings for Severity of Story Consequences in 
Sevef~ ·Endirtg Stortes: ' 
Story Mean Ranking Standard Deviation 
Charles 1. 13 0 54 
Jackie 2.48 .56 
Mark 2.68 .79 
Sue 3.68 .65 
n=29 Note: A rank of 1 being most severe and a rank 
of 4 being least severe. 
53 
Table 2 
Mean Rankings for Severity of Story Consequences in 
Mild· Ending· Std~ies 
Story Mean Ranking Standard Deviation 
Charles 1. 31 .75 
Sue 2. 13 .68 
Jackie ·3. 03 / • 7 6 
Mark 3.52 .67 
n=29 Note: A rank of 1 being most severe and a rank 
of 4 being least severe. 
54 
Table 3 
Chi Square for Rankings of Severe Ending Stories 
Rankings 
Story 1 2 3 4 Total 
Charles 27 1 0 1 29* 
Jackie 0 16 12 1 29* 
Mark 2 9 14 4 29* 
Sue 0 3 3 23 29* 
29** 29** 29** 29** 116 
fe *2:f row **l:f columns 
X2 (9. N = 29) = 156 02 001 ' •. ' p<. 
55 
Table 4 
Chi Square for Rankings if Mild Ending Stories 
Ran kings 
Story 1 2 3 4 Tot a 1 
Charles 24 3 0 2 29* 
Sue 4 18 6 . 1· 29* 
Jackie 1 5 15 8 29* 
Mark 0 3 8 18 29* 
29** 29** 29** 29** 116 
fe * f row ** f columns 
x2 (9, N = 29) = 107.02, p<.OOl 
Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations of O~inion Statements 
QJ. Sue Story 
Sue Story 
Opinion Statements Mild Severe 
Responsibility 
M 4.94 5.07 
so 1. 67 1. 66 
Intelligence 
M 4.36 4.63 
so 1. 17 1. 03 
Goodness 
M 3.45 3.73 
so 1. 03 .74 
Carelessness 
M 5.48 5.47 
so 1. 09 1. 20 
Foreseeability 
M 6.03 6.27 
so 1. 60 1.11 
Concern for Others 
M 3.65 3. 9 3 
so 1. 08 .87 
56 
Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations of Opinion Statements 
by Jackie Story 
Jackie Story 
Opinion Statements Mild Severe 
Responsibility 
M 5.90 6.07 
so 1. 73 1. 50 
Intelligence 
M 5.00 5.39 
so 1.15 1. 17 
Goodness 
M 3.83 3.68 
so .65 1.14 
Carelessness 
M 5.87 6.10 
so 1. 38 1. 22 
Foreseeability 
M 6. 17 6.42 
so 1. 49 1. 29 
Concern for Others 
M 4.20 4.30 
so 1. 22 1. 35 
57 
Table 8 
Means and Standard Deviations of Opinion Statements 
by Charles Story 
Chqrles Story 
Opinion Statements Mild Severe 
Responsibility 
r~ 3.23* 4.30* 
so 2.30 2.07 
Intelligence 
r,1 3.42** 4.50** 
so 1. 79 1. 28 
Goodness 
t1 2.68* 3.27* 
so 1. 30 1. 11 
Carelessness 
f·1 3.55*** 4.53*** 
SD 1. 70 1. 48 
Foreseeability 
r~ 3.32** 4.50** 
so 2. 15 2.03 
Concern fot Ot hei~ s 
M 2.74 3.33 
SD 1. 61 1. 2 7 
*£<.06. **£<.03. ***£<.01 
58 
Table 7 
Me~ns a~rl Standard Deviations of Opinion Statements 
by·,·Ma rk Story 
Mark Story 
Opinion Statements Mild Severe 
Responsibility 
t1 5.23 5.48 
so 2.30 2.00 
Intelligence 
t1 3.43*** 4.74*** 
so 1. 19 1. 65 
Goodness 
t1 3.30 3.26 
so 1. 09 1. 13 
Carelessness 
M 4.40** 5.58** 
so 1. 69 1. 61 
Foreseeability 
t1 4.93 5.13 
so 2. 10 2.22 
Concern for Others 
r1 3.87 4.07 




Means and Standard Deviations of C&mposite 


























Means and Standard Deviations of Opinion Statements 
by John Story 
John Story 
Opinion Statements Set 1 Set 2 
Responsibility 
M 3.25 3.00 
SD 1. 75 1. 55 
Intelligence 
M 3.77 3.73 
so 1. 09 .79 
Goodness 
M 3.36 3.60 
so 1. 31 1. 07 
Carelessness 
M 4.23 4.43 
so 1. 75 1. 33 
Foreseeability 
M 4.42 4.40 
so 2.62 1. 09 
Concern for Others 
M 3.67 3.80 
SD 1.17 . 9 3 
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